Continuous adversarial
testing.
Each published campaign names its attack class, attempt count, and observed pass rate.
17,000+
published attack attempts, T1 to T4b
- T1result published
- T2result published
- T3result published
- T4aresult published
- T4bresult published
- T5testing now
- T6planned
- T7planned
- T8planned
- Published
- Testing now
- Planned
Who we build against.
A well-resourced adversary can control the browser, modify the SDK, generate submitted signals, run many wallets, and study the public programs and circuits. The service treats every client field as untrusted.
Wallet-key compromise, coercion, attacks against device hardware, and compromise of private service infrastructure are separate categories. Native app and device attestation remain planned for a higher-assurance tier.
Three layers, one evidence stack.
Enforced checks decide whether a capture can settle. Temporal analysis remains research telemetry.
Cryptographic gate
Re-verification produces a Groth16 proof that committed fingerprints satisfy the circuit's Hamming-distance bounds. The Solana verifier sees neither plaintext fingerprint. A wallet's initial verification uses a validator-signed receipt instead.
Statistical distribution checks
The validation service checks the 308-feature summary against configured capture, phrase, acoustic, and distribution policies. It publishes no thresholds.
Behavioral coupling signals
The validator records speech-motion time-series relationships. Enforcement stays off while Entros measures reliability across people, devices, and adaptive synthesis.
How we test our defenses.
The private harness runs isolated and full-stack campaigns against the devnet pipeline. T5 remains open; T6 through T8 are planned.
| Tier | Attack class | Tests defense against |
|---|---|---|
| T1 | Procedural synthesis (script-kiddie baseline) | Absolute attacker floor |
| T2 | Parameter-varied procedural | Tier 1 statistical consistency checks |
| T3 | Feature-space optimization with source access | Tier 1 distributional realism |
| T4a | Pre-recorded human voice + procedural motion/touch | Layer contribution and phrase binding |
| T4b | Real-time synthesized voice (XTTS-v2, Kokoro, streaming TTS) | TTS artifact detection + content binding + Sybil registry |
| T5 | Coupled cross-modal synthesis | Current cross-signal detector |
| T6 | Targeted human-mimicry / identity theft | Blocked until T5 closes |
| T7 | Replay with adversarial perturbation | Min-distance floor + commitment registry |
| T8 | Black-box adaptive probing | Rate limits + response opacity |
Attack code, per-attempt telemetry, and parameter values that produce elevated pass rates stay in a private repository.
Current measurements.
A pass is an attempt that cleared every check enabled for its campaign. Each result covers its named attack, sample size and configuration.
- T1
Procedural synthesis
Scripted voice, motion and touch generated from simple procedures.
0%
0 of 2,000 passed
Hardened March 2026
- T2
Parameter variation
Procedural signals across several strategies and parameter ranges.
0%
0 of 4,000 passed
Hardened March 2026
- T3a
Unconstrained feature optimization
Inputs tuned against the feature space with access to the source.
0%
0 of 1,000 passed
Hardened April 2026
- T3b
Constrained feature optimization
The same search, held to realistic feature ranges.
This campaign surfaced a gap in server-side feature validation. It is fixed and listed in AUDIT.md.
0%
0 of 9,000 passed
Hardened April 2026
- T4a
Prerecorded human voice
A person's recorded voice with procedural motion and touch, run under four conditions.
- Wave 1100%
Temporal checks logged only · 50 runs
- Wave 210%
Temporal checks enforced · 10 runs
- Wave 30%
Plus phrase binding · 20 runs
- Wave 40%
Wave 3 at scale · 1,000 runs
Wave 2 surfaced a cross-program binding gap, now fixed. The final wave gives a 95% confidence interval of 0% to 0.37%. It covers this attack class, not all synthesis.
0%
0 of 1,000 in the final wave
- T4b
Real-time synthetic voice
Two TTS families and 58 voices speak the issued phrase, with procedural motion and touch, through the full stack.
No attempt reached the chain. The result covers the named models, voices and configuration.
0%
0 of 200 passed
June 2026
Still to run
- T5
Coupled cross-modal synthesis
Testing now
- T6
Targeted human mimicry
Starts after T5
- T7
Replay with perturbation
Next phase
- T8
Adaptive probing
After mainnet
Devnet Anchor counts include documented red-team artifacts alongside team and pilot captures. The public stats page reads the on-chain aggregate and does not classify wallet owners.
Last updated August 7, 2026
What we open-source, and why.
The client and on-chain protocol are MIT licensed. The private validation service and red-team harness stay closed.
Open source, MIT licensed
- On-chain programs (entros-anchor, entros-verifier, entros-registry)
- ZK circuit source and verification keys
- Client SDK (pulse-sdk on npm)
- Executor node
- Website and documentation
- Security program page and scoped campaign results
- Baseline adversarial testing (script-kiddie tier in pulse-sdk)
Kept private
- Server-side validation service (entros-validation): thresholds and parameter values
- Red-team harness (entros-redteam): attack code, per-attempt telemetry, captured baseline fixtures
- Pre-disclosure vulnerability reports (standard practice)
On-chain transitions, cryptographic checks, and client computations are public. The private service decides whether submitted evidence satisfies the acceptance policy. Its detectors and thresholds stay private to limit directed calibration.
Reporting vulnerabilities.
- Contact
- contact@entros.io
- Scope
- On-chain programs, SDK, executor, validation service, website
- Response SLA
- Acknowledgment within 48 hours, initial triage within 5 business days
- Safe harbor
- We will not pursue legal action against good-faith research within this policy's scope.
- Attribution
- Researchers credited in AUDIT.md and hall of fame upon fix deployment, unless anonymity requested.
- Bug bounty
- Planned post-mainnet. Severity tiers and amounts TBD.
Learn more.
- Research paperentros.io/paper
- On-chain programsexplorer.solana.com
- AUDIT.md, the public fix trackergithub.com
- Public adversarial baseline testsgithub.com
- GitHub organizationgithub.com